

UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC SCRUTINY FROM THE BIMA CASE: TRAJECTORY OF MEDIA HISTORY IN INDONESIAN CONTEXT

Moh Rifaldi Akbar¹

¹ Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta Raya, Jakarta, Indonesia; rifaldi.akbar@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id

Correspondence : rifaldi.akbar@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id

ABSTRAK

Tulisan ini membahas tentang pengawasan publik di daerah pada era media baru di Indonesia dengan mengambil kasus Tiktoker Bima yang mengkritik Pemerintah Provinsi Lampung. Tulisan ini memiliki tujuan untuk membuka pemahaman awam mengenai tantangan supremasi pengawasan publik kepada Pemerintah Daerah dalam lanskap media baru. Tulisan ini menggunakan paradigma kritis dengan pendekatan kualitatif. Tulisan ini menggunakan metode *desk research* dengan teknik ambil data melalui studi literatur dan kurasi data sekunder lewat sumber terpercaya di internet. Tulisan ini menemukan bahwa pengawasan publik terhadap pemerintah lewat media mendapatkan tantangan. Melalui kasus Bima, pengawasan publik tidak bisa dilihat secara sederhana, karena terdapat konsekuensi dari berbagai peristiwa yang memerlukan penjelasan sejarah, ekonomi politik media, dan kajian media dalam konteks Indonesia. Lebih dari itu, dalam kasus Bima, tulisan ini melihat bahwa tekanan terjadi dalam pengawasan publik karena empat hal, yaitu oligarki media Jakarta, hilangnya supremasi media lokal, peralihan dari media tradisional ke media baru, dan perbedaan relasi antargenerasi dengan kepemimpinan lokal yang korup.

Kata kunci

Ekonomi-Politik Media, Media Lokal, Media Baru, Pengawasan Publik.

ABSTRACT

This study discusses public scrutiny in the regions (*daerah*) in the new media era in Indonesia by taking the case of Tiktoker Bima, who criticized the Lampung Provincial Government. This study aims to open up an understanding of the challenges to the supremacy of public scrutiny of Regional Governments in the new media landscape. This study uses a critical paradigm with a qualitative approach. This study uses the desk research method with data collection techniques through literature studies and secondary data curation through trusted sources on the internet. This study finds that public government scrutiny through the media is challenging. Through the Bima case, public scrutiny cannot be seen simply because there are consequences from various events that require historical explanation, media political economy, and media studies in the Indonesian context. Moreover, in Bima's case, this study sees that pressure occurs in public scrutiny due to four things, namely the Jakarta media oligarchy, the loss of local media supremacy, the shift from traditional media to new media, and differences in intergenerational relations with corrupt local leadership

Keywords

Local Media, New Media, Public Scrutiny, Political-Economy of Media

Pendahuluan

The media has a watchdog function (Paul, Singh, & John, 2013). Academics who discuss mass media explain that the function of the mass media is as a channel to monitor people who have power (Casey, 2019). In the era of new media, the mass media has expansion of meaning which includes the process of creating, sending, and receiving audience-based information through various digital platforms (Owen, 2022).

Overall, the media system, which includes traditional media and new media, ensures that democratization goes well (Sharma, 2022). Sharma (2022) mentions that democratization here means audiences can be involved in progressive forces to check authoritarianism. According to Bezabih (2017), the government as a subject is an entity that represents the identity and interests of the wider community, namely the audience. More than that, the government is tasked with representing identity and serving the interests of the public (Bekkers, Edwards, & de Kool, 2013; Levinson-Waldman, Panduranga, & Patel, 2022; Scott, 2017).

Media, in the perspective of mass media, should function as a supervisor because mass media is a tool that forms an image of reality (Perse, 2008) for the public. Journalism content contained in mass media, such as news, aims to bring everyday problems closer to the community. Media is essential in articulating power, which involves the relationship between the government and audiences in this era (Bezabih, 2017; LibertiesEU, 2022; Muhammad, 2018). In other words, traditional media and new media are the fourth pillar (estate) in a democratic government. Nowadays, new media landscape is an additional channel that audiences can use to monitor government and public policies as audiences' digital interactions increase.

New media shift the traditional function of public scrutiny from traditional media (Knobel, 2018). But, the shift is not total, it brings a new way of public scrutiny a mechanism. This anomaly in the function of the media in overseeing government from the audience's point of view—for a long time—has caused local governments in Indonesia to be “allergic” to criticism. In simple terms, the transition from traditional media to new media causes new nuances in public scrutiny that are not entirely acceptable to policymakers. In the traditional media era, audiences generally obtain information through media institutions that control limited information. However, in the new media era, audiences deserve specific information through their authority, not based on exposure (Owen, 2022).

In the era of traditional media, audiences were interconnected with the same public discourse (homogeneous experience), which allowed audiences to participate in the same public criticism (Anderson, 1991). However, this study argues that the transition from traditional to new media is another strength of traditional media. New media has become an additional force and means for audiences to be involved in public scrutiny with more choices than before. Thus, public scrutiny through the new media becomes more massive. The creation of media content will largely be determined by the participation of journalists or citizens in reporting on daily issues (Waisbord, 2000). The goal is to increase community participation in public discourse, ensuring community participation in government scrutiny continues (Mallén, 2012).

Media facilitates government to be more transparent to the public (Apaza & Chang, 2017; Bezabih, 2017). New media causes audiences—as authors (McQuail, 2005)—to have the flexibility to create and distribute content. The author has a new sense of articulation because he can have the authority to create and distribute content that can

be done simultaneously (prosumer). Where during the era of traditional media, this could not be done. That new condition causes audiences to do citizen-based journalism that can improve scrutiny of government work.

The birth of the new media era is a consequence of civilization. Who can hinder innovation and the birth of the internet era, super-sophisticated gadgets, and SNS (Social Networking Sites) that brought us to today's new media era? There is not any. Our civilization has benefited a lot from it. Therefore, public scrutiny in the new media era is a consequence that needs to be accepted, especially by policymakers.

The new media era has led to the emergence of new ecosystems that impact audiences' media experience. SNS and social media are massively used for news distribution (Dunaway & Graeber, 2023). The era of new media causes audiences to have the power to create journalism content such as daily news. The era of new media has led to the creation of digital public spaces, which have led to greater attention from audiences in distributing their daily experiences, including citizen journalism through SNS (Yujie, Al Imran Yasin, Alsagoff, & Hoon, 2022).

The phenomenon of digital public space in the new media era certainly has impacts and new ways for audiences to carry out various cultural practices, including carrying out public surveillance through self-journalism (Ritonga & Syahputra, 2019). Social media is a medium that facilitates audiences to tell stories, send pictures, send videos, and make reports based on their daily experiences (Xiang, 2019). Therefore, we can see different content that audiences make covered by reports, vents, gossip, and stories of netizens' personal experiences. Sometimes the reports and stories deal with his uneasiness with public leadership. Audiences can construct new information in their digital public space that sparks the attention of thousands of others. We can see how audiences created threads, hashtags (#), and citizen journalism that later became a national concern (Losh, 2014).

In the Indonesian context, there are several examples of how the netizen movement can make massive changes to public policy, for example, the 212 Movement, Indonesia *tanpa* JIL, and several cases previously viral on social media causing policy changes, such as the "Mario Dandy". These examples show that movements in digital public spaces can impact governmentalism and public policy. The several examples above prove that audiences, media, and government are three things that cannot be separated from a democratic government, such as Indonesia.

In April 2023, the Provincial Government of Lampung received criticism from a Tiktok content creator named Bima. Bima is a resident of East Lampung Province (*Provinsi*) who is a student in Australia. Bima creates content about the lousy governance system in Lampung. Bima feels miserable with the road infrastructure in Lampung, while local policymakers live above luxury. This is shown by the evidence of the destroyed City streets, which he uploaded via his Tiktok homepage. This incident became the center of attention of the national community in an instant, along with intimidation carried out by elements of the Lampung Provincial Government. This phenomenon has become viral and attracted the public's attention, ministers, and celebrities. On the other hand, Bima received a large stream of support from national audiences.

This study sees that the Bima phenomenon—from now on referred to as "Bima Lampung"—can be a case that can be studied using various perspectives. This study placing media studies as the main point. More than that, this study seeks to provide a

broader perspective on the history of mass media, political economy, public leadership, and generational demographics in the digital space in the Indonesian context.

Previous studies have yet to discuss such a relationship entirely. For example, the Numandi (2014) explains that the development of ICT is a platform that should be used by local stakeholders to connect in digital public spaces (Nurmandi, 2014; Tariq Banday & M. Mattoo, 2013). Study Alfakoro et al. (2021) and Roengtam (2020) explain how local netizens used the new media era to increase participation in public scrutiny, which did not entirely run smoothly due to issues of privacy, personal security and the lack of digital literacy of local stakeholders (Alfakoro, Ismaila, & Ayodeji, 2021; Roengtam, 2020). Studies by Abraham (2015) and Bibu (2016) describe how the new media era is an adjustment period for government actors to understand the importance of citizen involvement in democratization and government scrutiny (Abraham, 2015; Bibu, 2016).

In contrast to previous research, this study offers a holistic explanation of public supervision in the Indonesian context. This study has a historical approach to capture the social and cultural changes during the pre-internet and post-internet eras of public scrutiny. In previous studies, public supervision did not holistically dissect the differences between public supervision in the pre-and post-internet era. More than that, this study provides additional information regarding specific phenomena and contexts, such as the Bima Lampung case. Thus, this study can describe the articulation of public supervision in a particular context within Lampung's cultural context and socio-cultural sphere. This is an exciting point in studying public supervision in Indonesia because this aspect may differ from other regions. Therefore, this article is a holistic study of media supervision in the new media era in a specific and specific cultural context using a historical approach without eliminating the critical aspects.

Metode

This study uses a qualitative approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, 2018) using the desk research method (Akbar, 2022; Juneja, 2021; Moore, 2018). Desk research emphasizes that data can be literal-based, as practiced by Claude Levi Strauss, which in today's context, literal data can be available on the internet. Researchers utilize secondary data through reports, literature, and trusted sources on the internet. The researcher's role is to synthesize the secondary data to get a pattern and general description of the phenomenon he is studying (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gibbs, G, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). To ensure the credibility of the data in this study, the researcher used "source triangulation" by expanding the three stages of data credibility through the three reference sources above, books, scientific journals, and trusted sources on the internet. This study uses data collection techniques in the form of literature studies by utilizing secondary data from various writings and trusted sources on the internet. This study uses data analysis in the form of three stages of coding, open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Holton, 2012; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Williams & Moser, 2019).

This study uses a constructivist-critical paradigm to understand the Bima-Lampung phenomenon more fully inductively. Researchers try to describe this phenomenon with power relations in the phenomena faced by Bima-Lampung. Researchers assume that the critical paradigm cannot be released in the Bima-Lampung phenomenon because it has a relationship between super and subordination. However, researchers still use the constructivism paradigm as a complement to describing the articulation of research problems.

In this study, researchers used several research steps. Among them are understanding the phenomenon of the problem as a whole and determining the novelty and state of the art of research. Then, the researcher determines the research boundaries. After that, the researcher conducted a literature study concurrently with collecting secondary data covering the research phenomenon. By adhering to the constructive paradigm, the researcher understands the problem inductively, and then the researcher also builds a sense of skepticism about the power relations that surround the research. After that, the researcher conducted data analysis using three coding stages, leading to the research arguments that the researcher wrote in the findings and discussion section.

Hasil dan Pembahasan

This study begins the analysis by explaining that there is centralized control by elites in Jakarta. These significant decisions often need more attention to regions and local supremacy. As a result, policies that centers concoct are constantly at odds with Indonesia's social format, which has long been diverse. Policies regarding the media concept in Indonesia do not pay attention to local supremacy. For example, networked TV (TV *berjaringan*) in Indonesia cannot be applied because of the interests of power, even though the law's mandate has regulated the importance of networked TV to facilitate local supremacy. Therefore, this study sees the importance of discussing the political economy of the media by the Jakarta elite at the beginning of the discussion of this study.

Political-Economy of Media and Television Control by Jakarta

One of the reasons for the failure of media democratization—in this case—broadcasting in Indonesia is the strong oligarchy in Jakarta. The mandate of Law (UU) 32 of 2002 Article 6 Paragraph 3 and Article 18 Paragraph 1 has explained that network TV in Indonesia should be a bridge for diversity and local supremacy in the Indonesian context. Networked TV is an aspiration that has never been realized in Indonesia. Networked TV has a goal to ensure democracy continues. Broadcast democratization is from, by, and for the local (*daerah*) point of view (Armando, 2014c). Networked TV tries to make the role of the local community control the media space, not the owners of capital and oligarchs. Today's television system in Indonesia still needs to implement the networked TV system. Areas outside Jakarta get the broadcasts they receive analogously or digitally from the Jakarta media office. This violates the rules because each region should have its own television station produced by the local community. This can cause television in various regions in Indonesia—dominantly—to be filled with local news taken from local journalists, local producers, and local editors. Thus, regional entities have a close relationship with problems in their region.

However, in reality, networked TV in Indonesia does not work due to the influence of power. The New Order (*Orde Baru*) government in the mid-1980s needed to be held responsible for the failure of network television in Indonesia. In 1980, the opening of transnational investment faucets, the growth of Jakarta's middle class, media politicization, and media conglomeration were the causes of the failure of networked TV, which was lined up to create democratization in Indonesia (Armando, 2015). Thus, private TV (TV *swasta*) is considered essential. Suharto caused the birth of private TV and the failure of the networked TV system in Indonesia (D'Haenens, Gazali, & Verelst, 1999). Suharto initiated the birth of family

businesses his children managed various business sectors from cars to TV. The TV business is something new compared to other businesses. Two of Suharto's children, Bambang Trihatmodjo and Tutut Hardiyanti Rukmana, became the initiators of the birth of Private TV (TV *Swasta*). Bambang Trihatmodjo started the television business in Indonesia through the establishment of TV RCTI.

RCTI is not Bambang's sole initiative, wherein Peter Sondakh and Peter Gontha are two of Bambang's right-hand men. Peter Sondakh had initiated RCTI, but the DPR always refused and needed to be more interested. Then, Peter Sondakh approached Bambang Tri, who later accepted his intention. This opinion was conveyed to President Suharto, so it was immediately approved. The kinship-based bureaucracy became important in the life of stakeholders in Indonesia at that time.

Several years after the founding of RCTI, Tutut founded TPI (Indonesian Educational Television). According to Armando (2015), Tutut envisioned including educational values in his program from the start. As a result, with this vision, TPI has the space to use the TVRI network to broadcast nationally. According to Armando (2015), this was a strategy so that TPI could broadcast nationally without having to network or build local TV stations.

TPI was the beginning of network TV problems in Indonesia. TPI, like it means to be a "golden child." In addition to getting a national network, TPI also gets revenue from advertising. In the end, the Government—with its kinship-based bureaucracy—allowed SCTV and RCTI to broadcast without a network system. This is where the initial dream of democratizing broadcasts through local media on network TV failed.

Furthermore, RCTI leases the Palapa satellite. Even though the broadcast beams were initially only aimed at the stations where they stood (RCTI in Jakarta and SCTV in Surabaya), the Government allowed national broadcasting rights (all over Indonesia) on RCTI and SCTV. This initiated the birth of other private television stations, namely ANTV and the Salim Group. Unfortunately, they can broadcast without using networked principles.

The initial step of setting up networked TV is over. In 1993, Indonesian Private TV officially broadcasted nationally, ignoring networked principles, democratization, and local supremacy. ANTV, which had built a station in Lampung, was forced to dismantle its broadcasting station, move its broadcasts to Jakarta, and broadcast nationally. According to Armando (2015), the unclear regulation on private TV in Indonesia has implications for Suharto's position dealing with his children and cronies. Thus, the policies issued by the Government at that time were a justification for the interests of the owners of capital involving Suharto and his close people. The national interest is under the family interest. This is where the disaster for the democratization of broadcasting and regional (local) supremacy begins. So, the loss of locality in the media landscape in Indonesia begins.

Loss of Locality in the Media Landscape in Lampung, Indonesia

Local television, as mainstream media in Indonesia has yet to operate comprehensively. This is a bad sign for the democratization of information in Indonesia. This article mentions the democratization of broadcasting several times because it is essential for the diverse social formats of Indonesian society. Why is that? Indonesia is a polyethnic nation-state (Eriksen, 2010). If distinguished from language, at least Indonesia has 700 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups (Akbar, 2019; Melalatoa, 1995). But, Jakarta controls the flow of information to diverse Indonesia (Akbar, Hidayanto, &

Widodo, 2022). Major media in Indonesia are based in Java, where Jakarta is the center (Armando, 2014b, 2014a). Therefore, local narratives should be addressed in the daily discourse of the people, even by the local people themselves.

Jakarta is overcontrolling local. It causes a lack of local knowledge in understanding its vernacular. In other words, regions have minimal treasures for understanding the reality around them. As we know, the media plays a role in shaping—to borrow McQuail's term—the audience's worldview. Jakarta manages information that often ignores regions, periphery, and margins. If anything, Jakarta uses representation (Hall, 2003) to describe areas. In other words, Jakarta has always portrayed regions according to its stereotypes.

The images that appear about the local in the media are about negative news, disasters, and the aboriginal side of the area (ethnification) (Armando, 2014c). This ethnification can occur because, for a long time, information editors were people with urban backgrounds who had formal city education. Therefore, the ability of the editor to produce a description of the locality is limited. They always see entities outside Jakarta as ambivalent entities (Baumann, 1990), so they need to be "educated," "trained," and "civilized" with their standardization.

In the context of Lampung Province, the Jakarta media oligarchy controls local media. For example, Tribun Lampung (Kompas Gramedia), Radar Lampung (Jawa Pos), Lampung Post (Media Group), and several other small media that do not have a significant impact is linked to Jakarta and Java control. Tribun Lampung is a Kompas Gramedia (KG Group) subsidiary with offices in Jakarta. Tribun (branch) Lampung is the thirteenth regional newspaper created by Kompas Gramedia through the Tribun (Triandana, 2016). Radar Lampung is a newspaper owned by Jawa Pos with offices in Surabaya, East Java. Jawa Pos has various business empires ranging from printing, tabloids, television, radio, electricity, and telecommunications. Jawa Pos also produces the Rakyat Lampung, Radar Lamsel (South Lampung), Radar Lambar (West Lampung), and Radar Lamteng (Central Lampung).

Nevertheless, related to the daily business turmoil that Jawa Pos receives, Sumatra Express, one of the Jawa Pos business branches that oversee Radar Lampung, has decided to separate from Jawa Pos (Putri, 2022). Lampung Post later became affiliated with the Media Group (owned by Surya Paloh, Indonesian politician based in Jakarta). Before deciding to merge into the Media Group, Lampung Post existed under the names Poesiban, Independent, and Post Ekonomi. In 1986, the Minister of Information gave an appeal to manage local newspapers.

The three major local newspapers in Lampung were never genuinely independent in management due to the absence of ownership and vision from local people. This triggers a reduction in the independence of local newspapers in carrying out their democratization function. Ownership of limited people (oligarchs) and a funding system controlled by Jakarta make local newspapers such as Radar Lampung, Tribun Lampung, and Lampung Post unable to carry out their supervisory function because they are bound in a power relationship. If the newspaper is a window on the audience's worldview, the editor, through local journalists, is responsible for shaping the local audience's worldview. However, the story will be different when editors and journalists have limitations in criticizing and describing reality because sectarian interests drive them.

In the context of Lampung, there are only two *Kotamadya* (Municipalities), such as: Bandar Lampung and Metro. Bandar Lampung has metropolitan status, Metro has Small

City status, while the rest are Regencies (*Kota Kecil*). Local media in Lampung Province is blunt because they cannot reach Lampung people evenly in various Regents (*Kabupaten*). Radar Lampung, Lampung Post, Tribun Lampung, and other local media only present most of their exposure in the metropolitan area, namely the Municipality of Bandar Lampung. This condition shows that the more peripheral an area in Lampung, the less exposure the local newspaper has. That matter also shows the minimal interaction of local (independent) journalists to report on their local surveillance through local media. Not to mention that there are other factors that cause local media to become even duller, namely that an empire of national media controls the media conglomerates with offices in Jakarta.

Local media exposure—taken from media marketing exposure—from the 65 thousand circulations of printed newspapers produced daily by Tribun Lampung in 2016 area

Table 1. Distribution of the Circulation of Tribun Lampung Newspaper in 2016

No.	City	Percentage
1.	<i>Kotamadya</i> Bandar Lampung	75%
2.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Lampung Selatan	8%
3.	<i>Kotamadya</i> Metro	4%
4.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Prinsewu	3%
5.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Lampung Tengah	3%
6.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Lampung Utara	2%
7.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Lampung Timur	2%
8.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Pesawaran	2%
9.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Tanggamus	1%
10.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Mesuji	0%
11.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Tulang Bawang	0%
12.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Tulang Bawang Barat	0%
13.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Way Kanan	0%
14.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Tanggamus	0%
15.	<i>Kabupaten</i> Pesisir Barat	0%

Source: Triandana, 2016

The 65 thousand copies of newspapers sold daily are only 0.70% of the total 9,176,546 residents in Lampung Province (BPS, 2021). Of the 0.70% total circulation sold, only 75% of circulation (48,750 residents) is distributed in the metropolitan area of Bandar Lampung Municipality. In other words, only 25% of circulation (16,250 residents) outside Bandar Lampung City consume local daily news.

These data shows that supervision from the local periphery is minimal. This also shows the need for more local supervision of local government in Lampung Province. In East Lampung (where Tiktoker Bima comes from) only 2% of the total 0.7% of the 9 million population of Lampung Province access Local Media. This is exacerbated by the minimal allocation of local news columns, in line with the vision of local newspapers to become mediatainment (media entertainment).

Local newspapers only had a significant role in the surveillance process in Lampung Province for a long time. Local television also lacks power due to the lack of experts, facilities, and infrastructure. The two popular mainstream media in Lampung

Province cannot become channels for public scrutiny. Therefore, this habit creates social distance between the government and citizens. Government agents view public scrutiny as disturbing the governance structure because such things are rarely encountered daily.

The involvement of independent and critical local-journalists in the regions is in a dilemma for them because the work of journalists can be easily traced. Safe local journalists' writing is popular writing that does not threaten the political-economic interests of the oligarchs. Thus, the best thing for regional journalists in Lampung is to join the flow of domination.

Lampung is not Jakarta. Lampung is only 250 km away (if a straight line is drawn) from the Istana Merdeka (Jl. Medan Merdeka Utara) and the Jakarta Governor's Office (Jl. Medan Merdeka Selatan). However, the demographics and social relations of the people are entirely different. Public scrutiny is an old narrative. It is relatively guaranteed in Jakarta as the heterogeneous population is also interested in overseeing the public interest in Jakarta. However, in Lampung, public government is the ruler. They have control over many people. Every local does not necessarily have independence. If they want to have independence, that behavior will be considered ambivalent. Those will be considered parasites who must be arranged so they don't disturb the existing order.

The diverse social formats of Indonesian society are fascinating to discuss because this is different in other countries. Indonesia is polyethnic, but its media system is centralized in its capital. This causes the need for more independence in local media. This study argues that the local media in Lampung are somewhat independent for three reasons. First, Lampung's "big" local media is part of Jakarta's business conglomeration. Second, disappearance of independent local journalist. Third, mediainment features become more mainstream than news in local newspapers.

Consequently, the people of Lampung have become a group that needs enlightenment from the media. This happened because the role of local journalists in Lampung's mainstream media was blunted. According to Wijaya's study (Wijaya, 2019), local journalists in Lampung act as lapdogs rather than watchdogs. Involvement in practical politics and individual political attitudes cause the mainstream media in Lampung to accommodate the interests of power rather than local interests. People in Lampung are trapped in a narrow reality rather than rich because local journalists in the mainstream media do not have the strength and power to be more investigative in describing daily problems that are the responsibility of the local government.

Native Son (Putra Daerah) and the Foulness of Local Democracy

For some people, democracy is just an imagination. Unfortunately, this perception has become part of the state's life in Indonesia, including Lampung. We often hear how public leaders are reluctant to accept criticism from citizens. If the criticism is accepted, it is not certain that their aspirations will be facilitated.

Indonesia is a country that has a diverse social organization background. Before Indonesia became independent and became a country that upholds democracy in 1998, Indonesia had gone through various historical dimensions and various political systems. Authoritarian leadership in the new order guided democracy and socialism during the old order, monarchy institutions, and small kingdoms in various archipelagoes before modernity and World War II ended. This condition has spawned crystallized political and cultural perspectives. Thus, the narrative about democracy in 1998 did not go hand in hand with local principles, some of which had not yet absorbed the meaning of democracy. This is accompanied by a landscape of local leadership, oligarchs, and local

elites that make democracy possible, but only through imagination. In the blood of local leaders—who will later lead under the names of Governors, Mayors, Regents, and *Camat*—they still carry the leadership style they adopted from a learning process since childhood, which is not democracy. They all grows up in the authoritarian Indonesia. Democracy, aside from being a political system, is a way of life—a view of life awakened from the learning process since childhood. Before becoming a Republic, Indonesia had several kingdoms, including the geographical area we know today as Lampung. According to historical records, there are two Kingdoms in Lampung: the Sekala Brak Kingdom and the Tulang Bawang Kingdom (Abdurrachman, Widiyantoro, Bambang, & Ismail, 2018). The kingdom of Sekala Brak is a more enormous empire than Tulang Bawang. The kingdom of Sekala Brak is considered the ancestor of the Lampung people because it was there that the Tumi tribe built their social organization for centuries. The Sekala Brak kingdom is thought to have appeared in the 1st—3rd centuries. The kingdom of Sekala Brak had Hindu nuances before finally being conquered by the Islamic empire of Pagar Ujung in the 16th century. This marked the shift of the Sekala Brak people on the slopes of Mount Pesagi to several administrative areas—which we now know as—Lampung Province (Raditya, 2017).

Polyethnic Indonesia is inhabited by non-migrant ethnic groups who have never moved for hundreds of years. Thus, these people build imaginations about excessive ownership of the territory they have lived in for generations. According to some Anthropological literature, identity purity and authenticity do not exist. No one's identity is original. Identity is a continuous, fluid, and changing process rather than something steady (Eriksen, 2010). Thus, the narrative of "indigenous people" is sometimes intertwined with other practical goals such as economics and politics. One example is the term "native son" (*putra daerah*), which is often used to achieve political goals, especially during the campaign period (Hatta, 2013).

The term *putra daerah* is often interpreted as positive. However, in Hatta's study, the son of the *putra daerah* is a tool to achieve identity politics. In the context of local leadership in Lampung Province, local leadership by local people (genealogical or geographical) has only been stretched after the reformation. After the release of the authoritarian Suharto government, Lampung Province was only "controlled" by local people. Governor Zainal Abidin Pagar Alam, a genealogical son, became Governor of Lampung Province from 1966-1973. However, after that, until 2004, the Governor of Lampung was never a genealogical or geographical son of the Lampung.

Maj. Gen. Yasir Hadibroto and Lt. Gen. Poedjono Pranyoto are governors of Lampung who do not have a hereditary affiliation with the Malays of Lampung. They became governors because of their political closeness to Suharto. In addition, other Governors, such as Oemarsono, Oman Sachroni, and R. Sutiyoso, are local leaders from various regions in Java. They had served as district heads and other administration officials in Java, such as Mojokerto and Cilacap. In 2004—2023, a new *putra daerah* became Governor of Lampung Province, starting from the leadership of Governor Sjachroedin Z.P., M. Rido Ficardo, and Arinal Djunaidi (Worldstream.org, 2005).

The governance by the local is not good enough. According to the 2021 ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch), Report, Lampung Province is in 26th position out of 35 Provinces in terms of the number of cases, namely three. Even though it is in the 26th position of the number of cases, the value of corruption that occurs is quite significant.

Lampung Province occupies the sixth position out of 35 Provinces, with a corruption value of up to 76 billion Indonesian Rupiahs (Anandya et al., 2021).

According to the Ombudsman Lampung Province, there was an increase in reports from 171 to 244 (70%) relating to the public good. The Ombudsman for Lampung Province also said that no Regency/City area in Lampung has yet received the status of a "Green Zone" (Ombudsman RI, 2021).

The corrupt government in Lampung and several other areas in Indonesia is an open secret. We can see how many KPK (*Corruption Eradication Commission*) detainees came from the regional head category. We can also see that it is unusual for the regional head to own assets compared to the monthly salary. Unfortunately, this unusual ownership is unintentionally shown through new media channels that tempt them to show off their wealth, like Instagram, for example. Therefore, this study argues that the transition from traditional media to new media, which coincides with the growth of the millennial and Z generations, means that local scrutiny can be carried out easily through their daily reports.

The pattern of corrupt leadership in Lampung overlaps with time and the transition from traditional media to new media. The pattern of leadership and political character is one thing that cannot be easily changed, while communication technology changes rapidly. The pattern of leadership and political character is inherited and disseminated in daily life without being able to adjust to the conditions of democratization and public scrutiny in the increasingly massive new media era.

Intergenerational Communication Conflict in the time of Traditional to New Media Transition

Arpanet started its communications media technology innovation with networked computer innovation—which we will later call the internet—in 1999. Within five years, the invention of the 1G—3G internet changed the media landscape and the experience of community interaction facilitated by the internet. Various forms of culture move from outside the network to switch to the network, all facilitated by the fast internet and SNS.

Public scrutiny becomes more accessible because everyone can become an information producer. In 2010, the demographic format of society in Indonesia changed. Where generation z and millennials are the most numerous cohort categories in Indonesia. In the context of Lampung Province, the demographic changes of the generation z and millennials—who are digital savvy—are accompanied by the migration of this cohort to other big cities in Indonesia to study and work.

In 2020, according to BPS data, the population aged 15-43 in Lampung Province was 3.9 million. This number represents 46 percent of the population of Lampung Province (BPS, 2021). Population aged 15—43 means those born in 1980 and above. In 2020 they will enter the generation z and millennials cohort categories (Debczak, 2023). The massive shift from traditional media to new media following the arrival of the super-fast internet (fiberglass cable) created a completely different media ecosystem before—at least—the 2010s. Before 2010, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, for example—even though they existed—were not popular in Indonesia and Lampung Province. New media provide new ways of controlling the production and consumption of information. In the new media era, users are prosumers who can manage their message production and distribution patterns more independently. In addition, the new digital public space facilitated by SNS has become a facility for the movement of new media agencies with new ways of criticism. Citizen journalism through "threads" on Twitter, for example. At

the same time, the digital space is 'controlled' by generation z and millennials, who actively use SNS at the global level.

GWI (2023) states that out of 276 million Indonesians, 36.6 percent are residents aged 18 to 34 years old (generation z and millennials). The data also states that 99% of Indonesians access social media. As many as 87% of Indonesians use social media to "search for information," which is the first reason for using social media in Indonesia. The time to interact with social media is 3 hours 18 minutes (an increase of one minute from the previous year), while the time to read books—which are physically printed—is only one hour 34 minutes (12 minutes less than the previous year) (Kemp, 2023). The data shows that the growth of the generation z and millennials in the digital space decreased time to read physical books, and increased hours of using social media on various platforms illustrate that the generation z and millennials controls public digital space in Indonesia.

Generation z and millennials generations have different characters from Generation x and baby boomers in seeing the world. The work formation shows that most of the generation x and baby boomers have become local stakeholders holding positions in local government such as Governors, Regents, Mayors, *Camat* at the regional level in the 2020s. Meanwhile, generation z and millennials are not much in the position of local stakeholders. The generation z and millennials have pragmatic characteristics, are device-native, desire to work more than the previous generation, are problem-solving oriented, and prioritize communication (Desjardins, 2019). Meanwhile, generation B has a character that has the opposite. They use these characteristics as a mechanism to—one of them—express anxiety. These characteristics create conflict between the two generations downstream from the digital space.

Lampung Province is one of Indonesia's regions with a high rate of out-migration. According to BPS data, temporary or lifelong migration out of the population of Lampung Province reached 740 thousand in 2020. This figure almost doubled in the 2005 census period, with only 400 thousand people (BPS, 2021).

When the generation z and millennials in Lampung migrate to various areas outside the city and abroad, they are carrying out a learning process. The learning process from other regions forms new experiences and standardization. This caused them to experience unrest when they returned to Lampung. They will begin to compare facilities, infrastructure, facilities, and public policies in Lampung. Outgoing migrants—which is one of its cohorts are generation z and millennials uses digital space via SNS to share expressions, including public scrutiny. This article argues that this is a consequence because the local media in Lampung is blunt about issues that concern the public interest.

Intergenerational communication has always been a problem. There is a communication gap in direct communication if two people from different generational backgrounds carry it out. Standardizing norms and verbal and non-verbal expressions often leads to misunderstandings between two generations. The younger generation sees the older generation as slow and out of date. Meanwhile, the older generation sees the younger generation as impolite and lacking in ethics. Therefore, divergent communication further widens the social distance between the two (Griffin, Ledbetter, & Sparks, 2019; West & Turner, 2010). Moreover, in communication mediated through SNS, many markers will allow communication misperceptions to occur, further widening the intergenerational communication distance.

Kesimpulan

This study argues that the Bima Lampung phenomenon results from various causes and events behind him. This paper study that this phenomenon occurs due to the latent accumulation of various events. For example, the media oligarchy in Jakarta, the lack of democratization of local media, corrupt local leadership, and the public scrutiny system in the transition from traditional media to the new media era. This study aims to provide a holistic theoretical contribution. This study argues that the regions (with the central government's support) need to build local media channels by ensuring the independence of local journalists. The local media must be independent and popular. To ensure this can happen, donor agencies and central aid need to be intensified to establish local media. Local journalists must be filled with generation z and millennials with minimal sectarian interest.

This study has several research limitations, for two reasons. First, this paper uses secondary data as the center of analysis which is approached with a critical paradigm. Thus, further research can approach the daily context and dynamics of public scrutiny in the new media era to open the views of journalists and the public. Second, this paper is in the context of Lampung Province, where research in the context of other provinces allows for enrichment in case perspectives, landscapes and research outputs related to public scrutiny in the new media era.

Referensi

- Abdurrachman, M., Widiyantoro, S., Bambang, P., & Ismail, T. (2018). Geochemistry and Structure of Krakatoa Volcano in the Sunda Strait, Indonesia, *13*(6), 1–8.
- Abraham. (2015). Role of media in promoting good governance. *International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT)*, *9*(September), 1–5.
- Akbar, M. R. (2019). Imaji Identitas Nasional di Ruang Diaspora Anggota PPI di Thailand. *Antropologi Indonesia*, *40*(1), 88--99.
- Akbar, M. R. (2022). Yowis Ben's Agency Changing Structure of Hegemonic Language in Indonesia Cinemas Becomes a Critique of Jakarta's Culture Industry. *Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, *20*(1), 33. <https://doi.org/10.31315/jik.v20i1.4782>
- Akbar, M. R., Hidayanto, S., & Widodo, A. (2022). Understanding the Inequality of Center-periphery Information Flow from the Migration of Seven Youths from Bandar Lampung to Jakarta. *Proceedings Of International Conference On Communication Science*, *2*(1), 843–852. <https://doi.org/10.29303/iccsproceeding.v2i1.66>
- Alfakoro, A. S. Y., Ismail, Y. A., & Ayodeji, A. H. (2021). Social Media and its Impact on Governance Building in Africa : The Nigeria Scenario, *11*(March), 9–12.
- Anandya et al, 2021. (2021). Hasil Pemantauan Tren Penindakan Kasus Korupsi Semester I 2021. *Indonesia Corruption Watch*, 39. Diambil dari [https://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/default/files/dokumen/Laporan Pemantauan Tren Penindakan Semester I 2021.pdf](https://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/default/files/dokumen/Laporan_Pemantauan_Tren_Penindakan_Semester_I_2021.pdf)
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Apaza, C. R., & Chang, Y. (2017). *Whistleblowing in The World: Governmnet Policy, Mass Media and The Law*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Armando, A. (2014a). Kegagalan Televisi Berjaringan dan Dampaknya pada Demokrasi di Indonesia. *Jurnal Komunikasi Indonesia*, *3*, 25–34.
- Armando, A. (2014b). The greedy giants: Centralized television in post-authoritarian Indonesia. *International Communication Gazette*, *76*(4–5), 390–406. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048514524106>

- Armando, A. (2014c). Urgensi Sistem Siaran Televisi Berjaringan. *Jurnal.Dpr.Go.Id*, 1–16. Diambil dari <http://jurnal.dpr.go.id/index.php/politica/article/view/333>
- Armando, A. (2015). *Televisi Jakarta di atas Indonesia: Kisah Kegagalan Sistem Televisi Berjaring di Indonesia*. Depok: UI Press.
- Babbie, E. (2008). *The Basics of Social Research*. United States: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Baumann, Z. (1990). Modernity and Ambivalence. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 7(1), 143–169.
- Bekkers, V., Edwards, A., & de Kool, D. (2013). Social media monitoring: Responsive governance in the shadow of surveillance? *Government Information Quarterly*, 30(4), 335–342. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.05.024>
- Bezabih, T. (2017). Mass Media and Governance: Issues and Challenges in Contemporary Ethiopia. *New Media and Mass Communication*, 61(May), 28–33.
- Bibu, N. V. (2016). New media and governance : Issues in democracy and the transiting public sphere in India. *Amity Journal of Media & Communication Studies*, 6(2), 64–72.
- BPS. (2021). *Jumlah Penduduk Indonesia 2020-2022*. Diambil dari <https://lampung.bps.go.id/indicator/12/45/1/jumlah-penduduk.html>
- Casey, M. (2019). Loss of local news hinders ability to watchdog government. Diambil dari <https://apnews.com/article/north-america-us-news-ap-top-news-ca-state-wire-media-816b31f8571d4b759227e58c6252e99d>
- Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). *Basic of Qualitative Research 3B* (Sage Publi). London.
- D’Haenens, L., Gazali, E., & Verelst, C. (1999). Indonesian television news-making before and after Suharto. *Gazette*, 61(2), 127–152. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0016549299061002003>
- Debczak, M. (2023). These Revised Guidelines Redefine Birth Years and Classifications for Millennials, Gen Z, and Gen Alpha. Diambil dari <https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/609811/age-ranges-millennials-and-generation-z>
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. Routledge International Handbook of Qualitative Nursing Research* (3rd ed.). New York: Sage Publication. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203409527>
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2018). *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Reasearch. Synthese* (Vol. 195). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1319-x>
- Desjardins, J. (Visual C. (2019). Generation Z: What to expect from the newest addition to the workforce. Diambil dari https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/meet-generation-z-the-newest-member-to-the-workforce?fbclid=IwAR3iiEDp3uuBACPq_qTrm40zDGpRteRqZUm4yPT-o_LSTi9KK8LrTUaLD9M&DAG=3&gclid=CjwKCAjwge2iBhBBEiwAfXDBR1Jadb9oz305UaBp91VCleBarXIaxNAfjQ1YjedsHWqFDy68YeABNxoChSYQAvD_BwE
- Dunaway, J., & Graeber, D. A. (2023). *Mass Media & American Politics. Sage Publication* (11 ed.). London: Sage Publication.
- Eriksen, T. H. (2010). *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives Third Edition* (Third Edit). Pluto Press.
- Gibbs, G. R. (2007). *Analyzing Qualitative Data*. London: Sage Publication.
- Griffin, E., Ledbetter, A., & Sparks, G. (2019). *A First Look at Commuication Theory Tenth Edition*. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
- Hall, S. (2003). Representation: Cultural Representations and signifying practices spectacle of the other. *Sage Publication*, 400.
- Hatta, H. (2013). Kampanye Politik Isu “Putra Daerah” Dalam Hubungannya Dengan Perilaku Pemilih Pada Pemilihan Gubernur Dan Wakil Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan 2013, 305–314.
- Juneja, P. (2021). Desk Research - Methodology and Techniques. Diambil dari <https://www.managementstudyguide.com/desk-research.htm>
- Kemp, S. (2023). *Digiysl 2023: Indonesia*. Diambil dari <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-uzbekistan>

- Knobel, B. (2018). *The Watchdog Still Barks: How Accountability Reporting Evolved for the Digital Age*. New York: Fodham University Press.
- Levinson-Waldman, R., Panduranga, H., & Patel, F. (2022). Social Media Surveillance by the. Diambil dari <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/social-media-surveillance-us-government>
- LibertiesEU. (2022). What Is Watchdog Journalism? Definition, Examples, Effects On Democracy. Diambil dari <https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/watchdog-journalism/43959>
- Losh, E. (2014). Hashtag Feminism and Twitter Activism in India. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*, 3(3), 11–22. Diambil dari <http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Kx>
- Mallén, A. (2012). Citizen journalism, surveillance and control. *Crime, Security and Surveillance: Effects for the Surveillant and the Surveilled*, (March 2016), 71–86. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.5182.6320>
- McQuail. (2005). McQuail's mass communication theory.
- Melalatoa, J. (1995). *Ensiklopedia Suku Bangsa di Indonesia. Journal of Chemical Information and Modeling* (Vol. 53). Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI.
- Moore, N. (2018). Analysing desk research. *How to Do Research*, 112–114. <https://doi.org/10.29085/9781856049825.012>
- Muhammad, A. (2018). Mass Media, Democracy and The Imperatives of Goof Governance in Nigeria: An Appraisal in Media Reflections on Governance and Development in Nigeria. *ACSPN Book Series 3*, 37–52.
- Nurmandi, A. (2014). Social Media Use: Rethinking Civic Engagement in Government. In *International Conference on Public Organization, Asia Pacific society for Public Affairs (APSPA)* (Vol. 4, hal. 9–15). Kuala Lumpur.
- Ombudsman RI. (2021). Kabar Perwakilan. Diambil dari <https://www.ombudsman.go.id/perwakilan/news/r/pwk--terjadi-kekosongan-stok-imunisasi-ombudsman-panggil-pihak-terkait>
- Owen, L. D. (2022). The New Media's Role in Politics. Diambil dari <https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/the-new-media-s-role-in-politics/>
- Paul, V., Singh, P., & John, S. B. (2013). Role of mass media in social awreness. *International Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences*, 1(August), 34–38.
- Perse, E. M. (2008). *Media Effects and Society*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Putri, A. (2022). Runtuhnya Imperium Jawa Pos - Remotivi. Diambil dari <https://www.remotivi.or.id/amatan/771/runtuhnya-imperium-jawa-pos>
- Raditya, I. N. (2017). Mengenal Kerajaan Sekala Brak sebagai Leluhur Lampung. Diambil dari <https://tirto.id/mengenal-kerajaan-sekala-brak-sebagai-leluhur-lampung-czon>
- Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (2003). *QUALITATIVE A Guide for*. London: sa.
- Ritonga, R., & Syahputra, I. (2019). Citizen journalism and public participation in the Era of New Media in Indonesia: From street to tweet. *Media and Communication*, 7(3 Civic Organizations in an Age of Distrust), 79–90. <https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v7i3.2094>
- Roengtam, S. (2020). The effectiveness of social media use for local governance development. *Systematic Reviews in Pharmacy*, 11(12), 218–225. <https://doi.org/10.31838/srp.2020.12.35>
- Scott, J. D. (2017). Social Media and Government Surveillance : The Case for Better Privacy Protections for Our Newest Public Space Social Media and Government Surveillance : The Case for Better Privacy Protections for Our Newest. *Journal of Business & Technology Law*, 12(2), 151–164. Diambil dari <https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/map->
- Sharma, M. (2022). Media and Governance. *Media and Governance*, 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.51952/9781447341444>
- Tariq Banday, M., & M. Mattoo, M. (2013). Social Media in e-Governance: A Study with Special Reference to India. *Social Networking*, 02(02), 47–56. <https://doi.org/10.4236/sn.2013.22006>

- Triandana, M. (2016). *Netralitas Media Cetak Lokal dalam Pemilihan Gubernur Lampung Periode 2014--2019. Skripsi. Universitas Lampung Bandar Lampung. Universitas Lampung. Diambil dari*
https://www.academia.edu/download/53224273/SKRIPSI_TANPA_BAB_PEMBAHASAN.pdf
- Waisbord, S. (2000). *Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, Accountability, and Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wenzel, K., & Babbie, E. (2016). *The Practice of Social Research. Teaching Sociology* (Vol. 22).
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1318620>
- West, R., & Turner, L. (2010). *Introduction to Communication Theory Analysis Application. McGraw-Hill Higher Education* (fourth). Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
- Worldstream.org. (2005). *Indonesian Provinces*. Diambil dari
https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Indonesia_prov.html
- Xiang, Y. (2019). User-generated news: Netizen journalism in China in the age of short video. *Global Media and China*, 4(1), 52–71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2059436419836064>
- Yujie, Z., Al Imran Yasin, M., Alsagoff, S. A. B. S., & Hoon, A. L. (2022). The Mediating Role of New Media Engagement in This Digital Age. *Frontiers in Public Health*, 10, 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.879530>